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Abstract—This paper deals with the security vulnerabilities of
the cryptographic algorithms A3, A8, and A5 existing in the GSM
network. We review these algorithms and propose new secure
algorithms named NewA3, NewA8, and NewA5 algorithms with
respect to the A3, A8, and A5 algorithms. Our NewA5 algorithm
is based on block ciphers, but we also propose NewA5 algorithm
with Cipher Feedback, Counter, and Output Feedback modes
to convert block cipher into stream cipher. However, stream
cipher algorithms are slower than the block cipher algorithm.
These new algorithms are proposed to use with a secure and
efficient authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol in
the GSM network. The proposed architecture is secure against
partition attack, narrow pipe attack, collision attack, interleaving
attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. The security analysis
of the proposed algorithms are discussed with respect to the
cryptanalysis, brute force analysis, and operational analysis. We
choose the NewA3 and NewA8 algorithms for challenge-response
and key generation, respectively. Furthermore, the NewA5 is
suitable for encryption as it is efficient than the existing A5/1
and A5/2 algorithms. In case when stream cipher algorithms are
required to use, our new algorithms, NewA5-CTR, NewA5-CFB,
and NewA5-OFB can be used for specific applications. These
algorithms are completely secure and better than the existing
A5/1 and A5/2 in terms of resistant to attacks.
Index Terms—GSM, COMP, Collision Attack, Narrow Pipe
Attack, Partition Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since in last few years, mobile communications have be-
come more and more popular due to its latest technological
advancements. Nowadays, people can communicate with each
other from anywhere anytime 24x7. The security measures
of first generation (1G) were taken into account during the
design of second-generation (2G) digital cellular systems.
Even the global system for mobile communication (GSM)
network has several security features, but these features have
several security and performance limitations ([1], [2], [3], [4]).
In particular, the GSM was implemented in more than 70
countries around the world till 2002 ([2]). Global penetration
based on total connections is set to exceed 100% in 2013 with
mobile subscriber penetration standing at only 45% by the end
of 2012, while by 2017, subscriber penetration in developed
countries is set to have passed 80% according to [3]. The
number of telephone subscribers in India is 1006.96 Million





MS Mobile Station/User –
HLR Home Location Register –
V LR Visiting Location Register –
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity 128
ServiceRequest Location Update Request/Call Attempt 8
UserProfile User Mobile/Reference Number 40
V LR ID Identification of the VLR 28
Count Integer Number 24
Kc Session Key 64
LAI Location Area Identity 40
V LR C Certificate of the VLR var.
Ki Secret Key shared b/w MS-HLR 128
DK Delegation Key 128
RAND Random Number 128
MAC Message Authentication Code 64







A8/NewA8 Key Agreement Algorithm
A5/NewA5 Specified for Data Encryption and Decryption
are 980.81 Million, according to [4]. Although we are running
towards 3G/4G cellular networks ([20], [21]), Golde et al.
in 2013, by performing a practical attacks showed that our
basic cellular network, i.e., GSM, is still not secure ([17]).
Therefore, it is required to investigate the GSM network
security before further moving towards the secure 4G/5G
systems.
A. Research Problem
Security algorithms COMP-128, A5/1, and A5/2 used in the
GSM network have already been proved vulnerable ([7], [8],
[18], [19], [11], [12], [13]). Due to this fact, GSM network
provides weaker security to the transmitted information over
the network. Even, original GSM authentication and key
agreement (AKA) protocol is inefficient and does not provide
secure environment. Hence, there is a strong need to propose
and develop a secure and efficient AKA protocol for the GSM
network. We have various proposed protocols for the GSM
network, which overcome the security issues of the GSM-
AKA. According to [16], the SAKA is the most efficient and
secure AKA protocol available for the GSM network. Further,
the security algorithms are also required to build in order to
accommodate sufficient security for the GSM network.
B. Contribution Summary
The following are our contribution towards improving the
GSM network security:
• The new algorithms NewA3, NewA8, and NewA5 are
proposed and implemented in order to overcome the
vulnerabilities existing in the A3/A8 (COMP-128) and
A5 algorithms of the GSM network.
• The proposed algorithms are compatible to SAKA pro-
tocol, which is one of the existing protocols for the
GSM network, and is secure against various attacks, such
as man-in-the-middle attack, partitioning attack, collision
attack, interleaving attack, and narrow pipe attack ([16]).
• Our analysis shows that the proposed algorithms are more
secure as compared to the existing GSM network security
algorithms. Further, our NewA5 algorithm is also efficient
than A5/1 and A5/2 algorithms.
We propose and implement new GSM algorithms compatible
with the SAKA protocol, as this protocol improves the major
weaknesses of the GSM network. Table I lists the various
symbols with their definitions and sizes, which are used in
this paper. Table II represents various functions defined and
implemented in this paper. The definitions of the proposed
algorithms, i.e., NewA3, NewA8, and NewA5 are same as the
A3, A8, and A5 listed in Table II.
C. Organization of the Paper
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews
the existing GSM security architecture with its security algo-
rithms. Section III describes proposed new algorithms for the
GSM network and analyzes their simulation results obtained
from the implementation. Further, Section IV discusses the
security and performance analysis of new algorithms. Finally,
Section V summarizes the conclusion of this work.
II. REVIEW OF EXISTING GSM SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The security architecture of the GSM network consists of
three algorithms as shown in Figure 1. The first algorithm
is A3 that is used for the challenge-response mechanism
in order to authenticate the user. The second algorithm is
A8 that is used to generate the key through key generation
mechanism and uses the output of the A3 algorithm. The third
algorithm is A5 that is used to encrypt/decrypt the message
information. However, the challenge-response mechanism is a
Fig. 1. GSM Authentication and Encryption.
Fig. 2. SAKA Authentication Protocol.
simple authentication mechanism and is insecure ([5]). Most
of the mobile operators implement a single COMP-128 keyed
hash function instead of using the A3 and A8 algorithms
together, which generates the 32-bit signed response (SRES)
and secret key 54-bit Kc in a single function ([10]). The A8
algorithm generates a 64-bit Kc, which is stronger than the
Kc (54-bit) generated by the COMP-128. The authentication
of subscriber identity module (SIM) of a user depends upon a
shared secret key between a SIM and the authentication center
(AuC) called Ki. This secret key Ki is embedded into a SIM
card at the time of manufacturing, and is also replicated at
the AuC. When the AuC authenticates a SIM, it generates a
random number as RAND and sends it to the subscriber. Both,
the AuC and the SIM feed Ki and RAND values into the
COMP-128 and a value known as SRES is generated at both
ends. If the value of SRES generated at the SIM card matches
with the AuC’s SRES, the SIM is successfully authenticated
and the user is verified. Thereafter, the AuC as well as the
SIM compute a secret key called Kc by feeding Ki and RAND
values into the A8 algorithm. In 1997, a leaked document led
to the publication of the COMP-128, which is used in place
of the A3/A8 ([6]).
In 1998, Marc Briceno, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner
published an attack on COMP-128 with that it is possible to
find out the secret key Ki ([7]). A partition attack was also
launched on COMP-128 ([8]). The A5/1, which is deemed
strong encryption and used in western countries, was reverse
engineered sometimes ago ([9], [10]). Several time-memory
trade-off attacks against A5/1 have been proposed. Most
notably, the recent attack by Biryukov, Shamir, and Wagner
that breaks A5/1 in seconds using huge pre-computation time
and memory ([18], [19]). Later, Tim Guneysu et al. described
time-memory trade-off technique that can be used for attacking
the popular A5/1 algorithm used in the GSM voice encryption
([22]). The A5/2 has been cracked by Wagner and Goldberg
with a methodology requiring five clock cycles and making
A5/2 almost useless ([11], [12]). Biham’s attack is feasible
with the current technology, which suggests that the A5/1
scheme should be replaced ([13]). A high speed reconfigurable
architecture is proposed, which implements A5/1 and A5/2
algorithms ([14]). Furthermore, a modified version of the A5/1
is also presented. However, it is based on linear feedback shift
register (LFSR) ([15]). The cell phones that use GSM, store
the data on a SIM card, which often stores upto 64 Kilobytes
(KB) or 128 KB of private data.
In the original GSM authentication protocol, an authenti-
cation request is sent to the visitor location register (VLR)
whenever a mobile user/station (MS) moves into a roaming
network and asks for new communication service ([16]). The
authentication request includes a temporary mobile subscriber
identity (TMSI) and a location area identifier (LAI). On
receiving the request, the new VLR uses the received TMSI
from the old VLR in order to get an international mobile
subscriber identity (IMSI) of the MS and then sends IMSI
to the home location register (HLR). Thereafter, the HLR
generates n-distinct sets of authenticating parameters {SRESi,
RANDi, Kci} and sends them to the VLR. Next, the VLR
sends selected RANDi to the MS. Once the MS receives
RANDi from the VLR, it computes SRES’ = A3(RANDi,
Ki) and a temporary session key Kc’ = A8(RANDi, Ki),
respectively, where Kc’ is kept secret for the communication.
Thereafter, the SRES’ is sent back to the VLR. Upon receiving
SRES’ from the MS, the VLR compares it with the selected
SRES kept in its own database. If they are not same, the
authentication is unsuccessful. Otherwise, the VLR can make
sure that the MS is legal ([16]).
Here, we discuss the COMP-128, A5/1, and A5/2 GSM
algorithms in brief as follows:
COMP-128 Algorithm: In the GSM network, the A3/A8
algorithm is usually implemented together as a COMP-128
algorithm, which was completely private and is used to gener-
ate 32-bit signed response (SRES) and 64-bit cipher key (Kc)
([6]). Various input and output parameters of the COMP-128
algorithm are described as follows:
A3 Input: 128-bit RAND random challenge, Ki 128-bit key;
A3 Output: 32-bit SRES signed response;
A8 Input: 128-bit RAND random challenge, Ki 128-bit key;
A8 Output: 64-bit Kc cipher key is used in A5.
Here, RAND[0...15]: challenge from the base station,
key[0...15]: SIM’s A3/A8 long-term key Ki, simoutput[0...11]:
Output of the SIM, out of which simoutput[0...3] is SRES and
simoutput[4...11] is Kc.
Note that Kc is 74...127 bits of the COMP-128 output
followed by 10 zeros. Therefore, the A5 is keyed with only
54 bits of entropy. This represents a deliberate weakness of
the key used for the voice privacy.
A5/1 Algorithm: The A5/1 is a stream cipher used in the
GSM standard ([18]). Several time-memory trade-off attacks
against the A5/1 have been proposed. Most notably the recent
attack by Biryukov, Shamir, and Wagner, which can break the
A5/1 in seconds using huge pre-computation time and memory
([19]). Later, Tim Guneysu et al. describe time-memory trade-
off techniques that can be used for attacking this algorithm
used in GSM voice encryption ([22]). The A5/1 stream cipher
is a binary linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based key
stream generator. All of the registers used in the A5/1 are
first initialized zero. Thereafter, 64-bit secret session key K
and 22-bit frame number F are XOR’ed in parallel into the
least significant bits of the three registers. In the next step, all
LFSRs are clocked for 100 clock cycles according to majority
rule. However, no output is produced during these cycles.
Finally, all three LFSRs are clocked according to the majority
rule to generate 228 bits of key stream sequence ([? ]).
A5/2 Algorithm: The A5/1 and A5/2 algorithms were
reverse-engineered from a GSM handset and were published
by [18]. The A5/2 is built from four LFSRs of lengths 19, 22,
23, and 17 bits denoted by R1, R2, R3, and R4, respectively
([12]). Clocking of R1, R2, and R3 are controlled by R4,
and R4 is regularly clocked in each clock cycle. The clock
control mechanisms of both, A5/1 and A5/2, depend on the
majority rule. However, input parameters to the clocking
control mechanism are given from R4 in case of the A5/2,
whereas in the A5/1 the input parameters are from R1, R2, and
R3. In each register, majority of two bits and complementary
of a third bit are computed. The results of all the majorities
and the right most bit from each register are XOR’ed in order
to form the output bit ([11]).
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS AND RESULTS
In this section, we propose the NewA3, NewA8 and NewA5
algorithms based on a GSM authentication protocol named
SAKA ([16]). This protocol is much better in terms of effi-
ciency and bandwidth utilization as well as is secure against
various attacks, including man-in-the-middle attack, replay
attack, and impersonation attack.
A. SAKA GSM Authentication Protocol
This subsection focuses on a review of the SAKA GSM
protocol ([16]), as shown in Figure 2. The NewA5 algorithm
is used to encrypt and decrypt the message using DK key after
the authentication is completed.
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF THE COMP(A3/A8) AND NEWA3 ALGORITHMS
Parameters COMP NewA3
(A3/A8) DK MAC VLR C
Execution Time (ms) 0.04 211.34 232.42 223.99
Heap memory (kbyte) 1007 2047 2047 2047
Total Memory (kbyte) 3529 6245 6245 6244
CPU Time (ms) 468 686.40 686.40 686.40
Swap Space (kbyte) 2027937 2038063 2036162 2051944
Physical Space (kbyte) 1313505 1230012 1219657 1233516
Virtual Memory
(kbyte)
46338 44998 45006 46636
Highlights of the SAKA Protocol: The major highlights of
the SAKA protocol are summarized as follows:
• Improves the drawbacks of original GSM authentication
protocol, including: not supporting mutual authentication,
large bandwidth consumption between the VLR and the
HLR, storage space overhead at the VLR, and overloaded
HLR with authentication tokens at MS.
• Eliminates the need of synchronization between the MS
and its home network.
• Generates lower communication overhead as compared
to all other existing and proposed GSM protocols.
• On an average, reduces 56% of the bandwidth consump-
tion during authentication process, which is the maximum
reduction of bandwidth by a GSM protocol.
We find the SAKA protocol more robust and secure, as it
follows the GSM architecture and resolves current existing
issues of the GSM network. This paper proposes three new
algorithms, named NewA3, NewA8, and NewA5 (secure con-
versation between the MS and the VLR) to replace A3, A8,
and A5 algorithms of the original GSM protocol respectively.
In the next subsection, we discuss about new algorithms
compatible to the SAKA protocol.
B. COMP(NewA3/NewA8) Algorithm
The A3 and A8 algorithms were implemented jointly in the
earlier version of COMP-128. But, we propose that NewA3
and NewA8 algorithm must be implemented separately. The
reason is that in the SAKA protocol, the NewA3 algorithm
is shared between the MS and the HLR whereas the NewA8
algorithm is shared between the MS and the VLR.
1) NewA3 Algorithm: The NewA3 algorithm is shared
between the MS and the HLR only. There are three different
cases with different parameters when the NewA3 algorithm is
used in the SAKA protocol.
• Case 1: Generate DK key at MS and HLR.
Input: 1) T1 (64 bits): Timestamp, 2) Ki (128 bits): Secret
key shared between the MS and the HLR;
Output: DK (128 bits): Delegation key;
• Case 2: Generate MAC1 at MS and HLR.
Input: 1) LAI (40 bits): Location area identifier, 2) T1
Algorithm 1 NewA3 Algorithm
1: Append zeros (384 zeros) to the left end of key Ki (128-
bit) to create a 512-bit string of Ki.
2: Perform XOR between Ki (512-bit) and input padding
(00110110 repeated 64 times) to produce 512-bit Si.
3: Append a zero before the Message (M’ = 0||M) and then
append the result to Si where each message M’ block is of
512-bit in size. If not, make it 512-bit size using padding
(zeros), thus, add 448 zeros to the message (64-bit) to
make it a 512-bit block. This prevents the HMAC against
related key-based narrow pipe attack ([23]).
4: Apply hashing to the stream generated in step 3 using an
initialization vector (IV) of 256-bit. This process generates
a hash code of 256-bit.
5: XOR Ki (512-bit) with output padding (01011100 re-
peated 64 times) to produce the 512-bit block So.
6: Apply padding to the hash code generated in step 4 with
256-bit (256 zeros) and append the hash code to the So.
7: Apply hashing to the stream generated in the step 6
and generate the output 256-bit using IV (256-bit). Now,
consider first 128-bit and next 64-bit for the generation of
DK and MAC1/VLR C, according to the case 1 and case
2/3, respectively.
Algorithm 2 NewA8 Algorithm
1: First three steps are same as in NewA3 algorithm.
2: Apply hashing to the stream generated in step 3 using an
initialization vector of 160-bit. This process generates a
hash code of 160-bit.
3: XOR Ki (512-bit) with output padding (01011100 re-
peated 64 times) to produce the 512-bit block So.
4: Apply padding to the hash code generated in step 4 with
160-bit (160 zeros) and append the hash code to the So.
5: Apply hashing to the stream generated in the step 6
and generate the output 160-bit using IV (160-bit). Now,
consider first 64-bit and next 32-bit for the generation
of MAC2 and SRES, according to case 1 and case 2,
respectively.
(64 bits): Timestamp, 3) Ki (128 bits): Secret key shared
between the MS and the HLR;
Output: MAC1 (64 bits): Message authentication code,
performs bitwise-XOR between T1 and LAI (with
padding if needed), and the output of it must be used
with Ki key as input to the NewA3 algorithm. Here, LAI
must be padded with 24 bits or 3 bytes, i.e., FFF.
• Case 3: Generate VLR C at HLR and MS.
Input: 1) MAC1 (64 bits): Message authentication code,
2) Ki (128 bits): Secret key shared between the MS and
the HLR;
Output: VLR C (64 bits): Certificate of the VLR;
We propose a NewA3 algorithm similar to HMACSHA256,
which is a secure MAC. The basic structure of the proposed
NewA3 algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1.
Fig. 3. Various Steps in the NewA5 Algorithm: (a) Initial Steps: 1 to 2, and (b) Final Steps: 3 to 7.
2) NewA8 Algorithm: The NewA8 algorithm is shared
between the MS and the VLR and is used in two cases.
• Case 1: Generate MAC2 at VLR and MS.
Input: 1) VLR C (64 bits): Certificate of the VLR,
2) Count (24 bits): Integer number, 3) DK (128 bits):
Delegation key;
Output: MAC2 (64 bits): Message authentication code,
performs bitwise-XOR between VLR C and Count (with
padding if needed), and the output of it must be used with
DK key as input to the NewA8 algorithm. Here, Count
must be padded with 40 bits or 5 bytes, i.e., FFFFF.
• Case 2: Generate SRES at MS and VLR.
Input: 1) Count (24 bits): Integer number, 2) DK (128
bits): Delegation key;
Output: SRES (32 bits): Signed response;
Now, we propose a NewA8 algorithm similar to HMAC-
SHA1, which is another MAC. Basic structure of the proposed
NewA8 is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithms Implementation Results: All the results pre-
sented in this paper are obtained on Core i3 processor, 256
MB RAM, 320 GB hard disk and Windows7 operating system
with JDK1.6 environment. The performance results of the
COMP(A3/A8) algorithm with respect to various parameters
have been summarized in Table III. The average time to
execute the COMP(A3/A8) algorithm is 0.04 milliseconds
(ms), while the process CPU time is 468 ms. The performance
of NewA3 and NewA8 algorithms with various parameters can
be observed from Table III and Table IV, respectively.
Table III shows the statistics of the output parameters
DK, MAC, and VLR C generated by the NewA3 algorithm,
whereas Table IV represents the computation of parameters
MAC and SRES, generated by NewA8 algorithm. The average
time for the NewA3 algorithm to generate DK, MAC (i.e.,
MAC1), and VLR C is 0.21 seconds (s), 0.23 s, and 0.22
s, respectively. Similarly, the average time for the NewA8
algorithm to generate MAC, i.e., MAC2 and SRES is 0.19
s and 0.18 s, respectively. The HMAC function provides more
security than the normal hash function. The HMAC function
uses a secret key that makes it more difficult to vulnerable
as compared to the hash function in which no key is used.
Therefore, the proposed NewA3 (based on HMACSHA256)
and NewA8 (based on HMACSHA1) algorithms are more
secure than the COMP(NPA3/NPA8) algorithm with SHA256
and COMP(NPA3/NPA8) with SHA1, respectively ([24]). The
execution time of the COMP(A3/A8) is lower than the NewA3
and NewA8. The reason is that the COMP(A3/A8) algorithm is
a simple and weak challenge-response mechanism. However,
the NewA3 and NewA8 are strong algorithms based on
HMAC. It is better to use a bit slow secure algorithms than
fast insecure algorithms.
C. NewA5 Algorithm
The NewA5 algorithm is shared among the MS, VLR, and
HLR. This algorithm is used to encrypt and decrypt the data
being sent during the communication between the MS and the
HLR/VLR over the network.
Input: 1) Data (variable size): Data to be sent from the MS to
the base transceiver station (BTS) and vice versa (considering
data is formed into blocks, and each block is of 128 bits), 2)
DK (128 bits): Delegation key;
Output: E/D Data (128 bits): Encrypted/decrypted data.
The proposed NewA5 algorithm uses its internal structure
similar to Blowfish, which is a symmetric algorithm. Blowfish
has a 64-bit block size and is a 16-round Feistel cipher that
uses large key-dependent S-boxes. Blowfish makes use of key
K that ranges from 32-bit to 448-bit, which are 1 to 14 32-
bit words. This key is used to generate 18 32-bit subkeys,
which are stored in an array P[0...17] and four 256 S-box
entries with 32-bit each as an array S[0...3][0...255]. For a
rapid execution, S and P arrays can be stored rather than re-
derived from key each time algorithm is used. This requires
over 4 KB of memory. The reason to choose Blowfish as a
basis for NewA5 algorithm is that till now there is no full
attack on Blowfish. However, previously a key recovery-based
attack has been found on AES with partial rounds ([26]). The
key generation process in Blowfish takes more time than AES,
whereas the encryption and decryption process with Blowfish
Algorithm 3 NewA5 Algorithm
1: Initialize 18 32-bit subkeys in an array P[0...17] and
four 256 S-box entries with 32-bit each in an array
S[0...3][0...255] using the fractional part of constant PI
(3.141...), P1 become leftmost 32-bit of hexadecimal digits
of PI (3.141...) and so on. The key DK is used to generate
18 32-bit subkeys.
2: Now perform bitwise-XOR of P[0] with the first 32-bit of
the key DK, XOR P[3] with the second 32-bits of the DK
key, and so on for all bits of the DK key (up to P[17]).
Repeatedly cycle through the key bits until the entire P-
array has been XOR-ed with the key bits.
3: Encrypt the 128-bit block of all-zero string using the P-
array of subkeys and S-array of S-boxes. Replace P1 and
P2 with the output of encryption. Encrypt the output of
step 3 using the modified P and S arrays. Replace P3 and
P4 with cipher text output. Continue the process, replacing
all elements of P-array and then all four S-boxes in order,
with the output of the continuously change in algorithm.
4: Encrypt the given input starting at the given offset and
place the result in the provided buffer starting at the given
offset. The input will be an exact multiple of our block
size. The plain text is divided into 4 32-bit halves LE,
LEM, REM, and RE. For each of 16 rounds do:
5: for i=1 to 16 do
LEMi = LEi ⊕ Pi and REi = REMi ⊕ Pi;
LEi = F1[LEMi]⊕ LEMi−1 and REMi = F2[REi]⊕
REi−1;
LE17 = LEM16 ⊕ P18 and REM17 = RE16 ⊕ P18;
LEM17 = LE16 ⊕ P17 and RE17 = REM16 ⊕ P17;
6: Decrypt the given input starting at the given offset and
place the result in the provided buffer starting at the given
offset. The input will be an exact multiple of block size.
The cipher text is divided into 4 32-bit halves LD, LDM,
RDM, and RD. The decryption involves the use of subkeys
in reverse order, however, algorithm direction is same as
was in encryption. For each of 16 rounds do the following:
7: for i=1 to 16 do
LDMi = LDi−1⊕P19−i and RDi = RDMi−1⊕P19−i;
LDi = F1[LDMi]⊕LDMi−1 and RDMi = F2[RDi]⊕
RDi−1;
LD17 = LDM16 ⊕ P1 and RDM17 = RD16 ⊕ P1;
LDM17 = LD16 ⊕ P2 and RD17 = RDM16 ⊕ P2;
is faster than AES. Therefore, we propose that all the keys
in P[0...17] and S[0...3][0...255] are stored on to the SIM
card. This is possible because nowadays we have 128 KB
memory-based SIM cards available. We consider the merits of
the Blowfish algorithm and develop the NewA5 algorithm, as
shown in Figure 3, in which each block size is 128 bits in size.
The NewA5 algorithm uses two Feistel cipher F1 (for 0...63-
bit of data block) and F2 (for 64...127-bit of data block) 16-
round each that provides more computational security to the
algorithm. The structure of both Feistel ciphers are as follows:
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF THE NEWA8 ALGORITHM
Parameters MAC SRES
Avg. Execution Time (ms) 190.23 189.68
Avg. Heap Memory Used (kbyte) 2048 2048
Avg. Total Memory Used (kbyte) 6244 6244
Process CPU Time (ms) 639.60 592.80
Used Swap Space (kbyte) 2031833 1990553
Used Physical Space (kbyte) 1186557 1172545
Virtual Memory (kbyte) 47562 47575
F1(x) = ((So, 24 + S1, 16 mod 232) ⊕ S2, 8) + S3, 0 mod 232,
and F2(x) = ((So, 28 + S1, 21 mod 232) ⊕ S2, 14) + S3, 7
mod 232. Various steps of the NewA5 algorithm are presented
in Algorithm 3.
Algorithms Implementation Results: The performance of
A5/1 and A5/2 algorithms based on different parameters can
be observed in Table V along with the runtime performance
between the NewA5 and original Blowfish algorithms. We can
clearly observe from Table V that the NewA5 algorithm is
much faster as compared to the Blowfish, A5/1, and A5/2
algorithms. The average time to encrypt and decrypt the
message is (0.065, 0.061, 0.7, 0.006) s, and (0.065, 0.061, 0.8,
0.004) s for the A5/1, A5/2, Blowfish, and NewA5 algorithms,
respectively. We can clearly observe that NewA5 algorithm
provides better encryption and decryption efficiency.
One major application for stream ciphers is to provide
high speed data encryption. It means that block cipher-based
keystream generators are not the complete solution. Due to
convenience use of block ciphers in various protocols, it is
suitable to convert it into a stream-like behavior, which can be
obtained via modes of operation in Counter, OFB, and CBC.
Since the original A5/1 and A5/2 algorithms were stream
ciphers in nature, thus we consider the NewA5 algorithm
with three modes of operation, i.e., Cipher Feedback (CFB),
Counter (CTR) and Output Feedback (OFB) mode to convert
the NewA5 algorithm message blocks into bits of streams.
Block ciphers encrypt a fixed size block of plaintext at a
time to produce a block of cipher text, whereas stream ciphers
encrypt stream data one/more bit(s) at a time. Table 6 presents
the performance of the NewA5 algorithm with counter mode
(NewA5-CTR), NewA5 with CFB mode (NewA5-CFB), and
NewA5 with OFB mode (NewA5-OFB). All the parameters
generate almost the same results for all three algorithms (as
shown in Table VI). The encryption and decryption can be
performed in parallel in CTR mode, therefore, we consider
the counter mode to integrate with the NewA5 algorithm for
providing better security.
IV. DISCUSSION: SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section discusses security analysis of the attacks found
on the GSM algorithms as well as impacts on the NewA3,
NewA8 and NewA5 algorithms.
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE OF THE A5/1, A5/2, AND NEWA5 ALGORITHMS VS.
BLOWFISH ALGORITHM
Parameters A5/1 A5/2 NewA5 Blowfish
Enc. Time (ms) 0.065 0.061 0.006 0.7
Dec. Time (ms) 0.065 0.061 0.004 0.8
Heap memory (kbyte) 351 351 378 379
Total Memory (kbyte) 12694 12693 12741 12739
TABLE VI








Enc. Time (ms) 0.019 0.018 0.019
Dec. Time (ms) 0.005 0.004 0.005
Heap Memory (kbyte) 385 385 394
Total Memory (kbyte) 14927 14927 14926
CPU Time (s) 624004 608403 639604
Swap Space (kbyte) 1999302 1192441 1981927
Physical Space (kbyte) 1191845 1191440 1170485
Virtual Memory (kbyte) 48377 48414 48369
A. Attacks on Existing GSM Algorithms
This subsection discusses security aspects of the new pro-
posed algorithms against various attacks, which have been
found on existing GSM algorithms.
1) Partitioning Attack: In the case of COMP-128, an im-
portant characteristic is that the processor can only address
8-bit. However, the first s-box consists of 512 values, which
need an address room of 9-bit. Thus, the table needs to split in
minimum two pieces. The IBM engineers made the assumption
that the table is just split in the middle ([8]). In our scheme,
we propose to implement NewA3 and NewA8 algorithms
separately unlike as in the existing GSM network, where most
operators implement a single joint algorithm, named COMP-
128 instead of two algorithms. Since our NewA3 and NewA8
algorithms are based on HMAC functions and do not use S-
boxes in the algorithm. Therefore, our algorithms are secure
against partitioning attack.
2) Narrow Pipe Attack: A collision attack is possible
because 95% of the collisions in the output originate in the
second round of the COMP-128, whereas a collision in the first
round is impossible, since it is a one-to-one mapping ([27]).
With their analysis, Briceno et al. found that in particular,
bytes i, i+8, i+16, i+24 at the output of the second round
depend only on bytes i, i+8, i+16, i+24 of the input to the
COMP128 ([7]). This fact is called narrow pipe. This attack
can compromise the HMAC function theoretically only with
related key, whereas the hash functions used with HMAC can
be compromised with single and related keys ([23]). Since one
of the best features of HMAC is that it uses a hash function
as a black box, without any need to change the primitive
implementation, our goal is to find a patch that does not affect
the hash function definition and could prevent HMAC against
this attack. Our proposed solution is to force an extra fixed bit
(or byte) before the input message M ([23]). To prevent the
NewA3 and NewA8 algorithms against narrow pipe attack, we
propose to (1) use different initialization vector (IV) values for
the inner and outer hash functions in HMAC, (2) append a zero
before the message (M’= 0||M) and then append the result to
Si in both algorithms, where each message M’ block is about
512-bit in size, and (3) perform ⊕ operation with constant
10101010 to the inner and/or outer hash message input to
differentiate the input and output computations. We used first
two options in our implementation to prevent HMAC-based
algorithms against narrow pipe attack, while the third option
may increase the computation, therefore not considered.
3) Collision Attack: The aim of this attack is to compute
the secret subscriber-specific authentication key. It exploits a
weakness in the COMP-128 that allows information to be
deduced about the key when two different challenges to the
card (input values to the algorithm) produce the same output
([28]). In the SAKA protocol, at each MS, DK key is generated
by passing a unique key Ki and a timestamp T1 to a pre-
specified algorithm NewA3. Hence, the possibility to generate
same output by two MSs is very low. Since the NewA3 and
NewA8 algorithms are based on HMAC functions, hence, are
free from collision attack, as collision attack does not affect
the security of cryptographic hash/HMAC function.
4) Interleaving Attack: In the interleaving attack, an adver-
sary can derive the information from the current or previous
authentication exchanges. The input parameters in different
cases of the NewA3 and NewA8 algorithms are (T1, T1,
MAC1) and (Count, Count), respectively, for each case, where
MAC1 also depends on T1. These T1 and Count change each
time an authentication request is generated within an expiry
time. Hence, if the other parameters are same for NewA3 and
NewA8 algorithms, an adversary cannot derive DK or Ki key
based on previous authentication exchanges. Therefore, these
algorithms are secure against interleaving attack.
5) Man-in-the-middle Attack: The man-in-the-middle at-
tack allows an adversary to access secret information by
intercepting and altering the communication between the com-
municating parties. In the SAKA protocol, the communication
between the MS and the VLR/HLR takes place using the
NewA5 algorithm, which is used to encrypt and decrypt the
message. Hence, our system is free from MITM attack.
B. Time Complexity of the New Algorithms
Algorithmic time complexity of an algorithm depends on
the operations performed in its various steps. Our NewA3
algorithm performs various internal operations, such as 2
XOR, 6 ||, selection of required bits (128-bit and 64-bit out
of 256-bit), and SHA256. The SHA256 executes 80 rounds
with AND, OR, XOR, ROT, ADD, and MOD 232 operations.
Since the algorithm’s input size is fixed, these operations can
be performed in O(1). Similarly, the NewA8 algorithm also
has time complexity of O(1) with extra SHIFT operation. The
complexity of the NewA5 algorithm is O(1) as the input size
is a fixed block size. However, for the NewA5-CTR, NewA5-
CFB, and NewA5-OFB algorithms, it is O(m), where m is size
of input message.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the security considerations related to the GSM
wireless security have been taken into account. A set of new
secure algorithms, i.e., NewA3, NewA8, and NewA5, has been
proposed and implemented in order to overcome the known
vulnerabilities against A3, A8, and A5 algorithms existing in
the GSM network. Three variants of the NewA5 algorithm
have also been proposed and implemented, which convert the
block ciphers into the stream ciphers, out of which the NewA5
with counter mode provides parallelism to the encryption and
decryption process. The algorithms proposed in this paper
are cryptographically strong enough to use in place of the
algorithms used in the GSM network.
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